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CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING: JUST 
ANOTHER FORM OF PAYDAY 
LENDING? 
PAIGE MARTA SKIBA∗ AND JEAN XIAO∗∗ 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumer litigation funding is a controversial form of credit used by 
plaintiffs. While his lawsuit is pending, a plaintiff can obtain a cash advance from 
a financier who is not a party in the lawsuit. In exchange for the upfront cash, the 
plaintiff owes the financier the principal plus interest and fees out of the proceeds 
of the lawsuit. Such advances are nonrecourse in the sense that the financier 
cannot obtain repayment outside of the case. If the lawsuit proceeds are less than 
the total amount owed to the financier, the plaintiff must pay the financier only 
the lawsuit proceeds; if the plaintiff loses the case, then he owes nothing. Despite 
paying interest in exchange for a cash principal, this type of credit is not legally 
considered a “loan” in most states. Therefore, this article uses the terms 
“funding,” “litigation/legal funding,” “litigation/legal finance,” and “nonrecourse 
loan/advance” interchangeably to refer to consumer litigation funding with the 
caveat that the terminology for this credit product is currently being disputed.1 
Opponents of funding have analogized it to payday lending because both 
financial products involve high interest rates.2 Payday lending is another form of 
high-cost, short-term credit. A consumer with proof of income and a bank 
account can obtain a payday loan with an obligation to fully or partially pay back 
the loan out of the consumer’s next paycheck. 
In a 2015 case, Oasis Legal Finance Group, L.L.C. v. Coffman, the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that the same regulations that govern payday lending also 
Copyright © 2017 by Paige Marta Skiba and Jean Xiao. 
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1. Some states (for example, Colorado) consider funding a “loan” under state usury laws, but
others define it as a financial service distinct from a loan (for example, Ohio, where the term 
“nonrecourse civil litigation advance” is used). See Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 
400, 401 (Colo. 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2016).  
2.  Sara Warner, Like Payday Loans, Lawsuit Loans Increasingly Coming Under Fire,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sara-warner/like-payday-
loans-lawsuit_1_b_5692187.html [https://perma.cc/38A7-957Q].  
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cover consumer litigation funding.3 Specifically, the court declared that such 
funding constitutes a “loan” that is governed under the Uniform Consumer 
Credit Act.4 In an amici curiae brief in support of Attorney General Coffman, 
the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the Center for Responsible 
Lending, the Consumer Federation of America, and the National Consumer Law 
Center argued that legal finance companies were making loans to consumers.5 
These organizations argued that lenders should not be able to skirt the state’s 
usury regulation by manipulating the form of their financial services.6 In support 
of their position, they cited multiple situations in which payday lenders have 
attempted to dodge state governance.7 In the past, payday lenders have 
unsuccessfully argued that the advances they gave to consumers were not loans 
but instead deferred deposits of checks, sales of gift certificates, or Internet 
service transactions.8 
But is consumer litigation funding just another form of payday lending, or are 
consumer advocacy organizations mistaken by grouping these two types of credit 
together? How should consumer litigation funding be governed? Optimal 
regulation of financial products requires policymakers to understand how the 
services operate and how consumers respond to them. State legislatures are 
rapidly addressing legal finance as it rises in popularity. Currently, nine states 
have stable laws in place to govern nonrecourse advances,9 and many others are 
considering bills that would implement statutory provisions to govern these 
advances.10 As regulators decide on an approach to address funding, they should 
not hastily group funding and payday lending together—they need to understand 
the nuances of these two business practices and their consequences for 
consumers. 
This article provides a side-by-side comparison of payday lending and 
consumer litigation funding in order to aid policymakers. First, part II describes 
how these two alternative credit sources work and how borrowers use their cash 
advances. This article is the first to employ a large dataset from a national legal 
financier and provide an empirical analysis of the usage of legal finance. The 
findings demonstrate that the percentages of consumers that spend funding on 
 
 3.  Oasis, 361 P.3d at 401; Jacob Gershman, Payday Lending Rules Apply to Litigation Funding, 
Colorado Court Rules, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/11/17/ 
payday-lending-rules-apply-to-litigation-funding-colorado-court-rules/ [https://perma.cc/9SJV-G5YG].  
 4.  Oasis, 361 P.3d at 401. 
 5.  Brief Amici Curiae of National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. in Support of 
Respondents at 12, Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015) (No. 2013SC497) 
[hereinafter Consumer Organizations’ Brief]. 
 6.  Id. at 32. 
 7.  Id. at 32–36.  
 8.  Id.; see also Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 18–25 (2002) (describing how payday lenders have disguised their loans).  
 9.  See infra Table 3.  
 10.  Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2015 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF 
ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/ 
litigation-or-lawsuit-funding-transactions-2015-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/PA87-9D9Y].  
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utilities, car payments, bills, rent, mortgage payments, food, and unexpected 
expenses are comparable to the percentages of consumers that spend payday 
loans on these living expenses. Thus, on the surface, these two forms of high-cost 
credit that lie outside of the traditional banking system appear similar.11 Beneath 
the surface, though, many differences emerge. There are two traits unique to legal 
finance on which policy guidelines should turn: funding is nonrecourse—in other 
words, financiers cannot collect anything beyond the lawsuit proceeds—and 
funding is tied to the complex litigation process. 
Because funding is nonrecourse, its customers cannot fall into the debt spiral 
that regulators often worry about with respect to payday lending.12 However, this 
does not mean that nonrecourse advances are innocuous. Using wisdom from the 
behavioral economics literature, part III explains that funding’s relationship to 
litigation obscures its effect on the consumer’s cash flow and that the involvement 
of litigation adds a layer of complexity and uncertainty to calculating the price of 
funding, a problem not implicated by payday loans. All in all, consumers may 
have an even more difficult time understanding the true cost of legal finance than 
that of payday loans. 
Finally, part IV examines three types of policies—bans, restrictions on loan 
characteristics, and disclosure laws—that have been used to regulate payday 
lending and explores whether analogous laws would effectively govern funding 
and ensure that the product is transparent to consumers. From an economics 
perspective, policymakers should prohibit funding only when this financial 
product on net harms consumers. Empirical research is central to understanding 
whether this product will harm or help borrowers. A ban would not be the best 
approach at this time for two reasons: the legal finance industry has not reached 
a competitive equilibrium, and little empirical evidence currently exists as to the 
consumer welfare effects of funding. Restrictions on loan characteristics, such as 
caps on interest or limits on duration, would not be ideal because they are hard 
to implement, hurt low-income borrowers, and may be evaded by financiers. 
However, disclosure laws, coupled with attorney acknowledgments, would 
provide effective consumer protection because these laws could help plaintiffs 
understand the true cost of nonrecourse loans—something that is currently 
difficult given funding’s tie to litigation, a complicated process with an uncertain 
end date. 
This article makes the following two policy recommendations. First, to 
remedy the lack of empirical research upon which policymakers can make 
effective and educated decisions, states should partner with financiers to gather 
data on customer characteristics and outcomes in order to study the effects of 
 
 11.  See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in 
the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 95 (2008) (arguing that litigation funding fits into the wide 
subprime lending market that includes payday lending). 
 12.  See, e.g., David Silberman, We’ve Proposed a Rule to Protect Consumers from Payday Debt 
Traps, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU BLOG (June 2, 2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/blog/weve-proposed-rule-protect-consumers-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/N5PK-9KV3].  
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funding on consumer welfare. Some states currently have reporting requirements 
for financiers,13 but because such data are at the aggregate level, they are not 
useful for analyzing consumer well-being. Second, to address the difficulty in 
comprehending the true cost of funding, states should implement robust 
disclosure laws that differ from those currently in place. Nine states have imposed 
funding disclosure requirements that are similar to those in the Truth in Lending 
Act for payday lending.14 These laws require, for example, a minimum font size, 
itemization of one-time fees, a schedule of repayments, and disclosure of the 
annual percentage rate (APR). In the funding context, however, these disclosures 
do not help plaintiffs understand the loans. Plaintiffs do not have legal expertise 
and likely lack the financial sophistication necessary to estimate when a 
nonrecourse advance will be due and how much the eventual interest and fees 
will amount to. Even for the savviest plaintiffs, such computations would be 
difficult. Financiers should use data analysis to provide borrowers an expected 
payment date and expected total payment—rather than just providing the APR 
and a schedule of the amount owed for a series of six-month intervals. Further, 
in order to prevent financiers from burying the cost disclosures deep in contracts 
or pressuring plaintiffs into signing without reading the disclosures, the disclosure 
laws should be coupled with attorney-acknowledgment provisions. These 
provisions, which five states have implemented, require attorneys to provide 
written acknowledgments to verify that costs of funding have been disclosed to 
the plaintiffs.15 
II 
PAYDAY LENDING VERSUS CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING:  
FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
A payday loan is a one-to-two-week cash advance of no more than $1,000.16 
Lenders charge about 10–20% per $100, which is equivalent to a 260–520 APR.17 
Payday lending has pervaded the universe of alternative credit in the United 
States: there are over twenty thousand payday outlets, more than the number of 
McDonald’s, J.C. Penney, and Target outlets nationwide.18 A customer typically 
applies for a payday loan by going to a brick-and-mortar lender and supplying 
proof of income and personal information; personal information can include the 
customer’s government-issued identification, monthly bills, and most recent 
 
 13.  See ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-107 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3309 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN.  
tit. 8, § 2260 (2016). 
 14.  See infra Table 3.  
 15.  See IND. CODE § 24-12-2-1 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
3303 (2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2016); TENN. CODE § 47-16-104 (2016). 
 16.  Neil Bhutta et al., Payday Loan Choices and Consequences, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 
223, 227 (2015).  
 17.  Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 
1027 (2012). 
 18.  Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2007, at 169, 169–70. 
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checking account statement.19 Though some payday lenders obtain a subprime 
credit score to evaluate loan applications,20 a consumer’s payday loan obligations 
and repayment behavior, including default, are not reported to the national credit 
bureaus, such as Equifax. Thus, payday lending does not directly affect the 
consumer’s traditional credit score.21 
To obtain a payday loan, the customer writes a postdated check or agrees 
online to a debit authorization that covers the loan amount plus interest and 
fees.22 The lender can cash the check or debit the account on or after the loan’s 
due date—that is, the customer’s subsequent payday.23 Borrowers may also “roll 
over,” or renew, their loan by paying the associated fees. They will then gain an 
extra earnings cycle to pay off the principal and any additional interest.24 
Rollovers are the norm. According to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 80% of payday loans are renewed within fourteen days.25 A study 
conducted in 2014 showed that 50% of all payday loans were in a renewal chain 
at least ten loans long.26 Approximately 48% of new consumers roll over their 
loans at least once.27 While payday loan use may be perfectly rational for cash-
constrained consumers,28 critics view renewals as evidence of a debt trap: 
“borrowers are tempted into borrowing $300 for two weeks expecting to pay $45, 
but wind up paying many times that amount as they borrow repeatedly.”29 
Approximately five million payday loan customers get caught in this cycle of debt 
a year, estimated to cost them $3.4 billion annually.30 Payday loans may also 
indirectly affect consumers’ ability to pay off other debts.31 
According to a report issued by the Pew Charitable Trusts, 53% of borrowers 
used their first payday loan for utilities, car payments, credit card bills, or 
prescription drugs; 10% for mortgage or rent; 5% for food; 16% for unexpected 
expenses such as emergency medical bills; and 8% for “something special” such 
 
 19.  Bhutta et al., supra note 16, at 227. 
 20.  E.g., id. at 239–40.  
 21.  Id. at 227.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 227–28. 
 25.  KATHLEEN BURKE ET AL., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY 
LENDING 4 (2014).  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 4–5. 
 28.  See Skiba, supra note 17, at 1026–27 (“From an economist’s perspective, credit in general allows 
consumers to smooth consumption over time, meaning that they borrow from future good times to help 
make it through current tough times.”). 
 29.  DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT 
NO. 309, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS 9 (2008).  
 30.  KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST 
OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 2 (2004), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/ 
research-analysis/CRLpaydaylendingstudy121803.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM8S-UG5B].  
 31.  See Bhutta et al., supra note 16, at 228 (“[Payday] loans affect consumers’ ability to meet their 
financial obligations in general.”). 
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as gifts, vacation, or entertainment.32 The Payday Loans column in Table 1 
depicts this breakdown. The fact that 68% of borrowers are using their payday 
loans for living expenses suggests that consumers are using these loans as a last 
resort. Empirical research supports the notion that payday loan customers are 
liquidity-constrained. Both Carter and Bos et al. provide evidence that such 
customers are using pawnshops as a second form of credit to help meet their 
payday loan interest payments and roll over their loans.33 According to Agarwal 
et al., consumers’ liquidity dramatically deteriorates in the five months before 
they take out payday loans.34 Carter et al. show that credit union members who 
borrowed from payday lenders had lower levels of liquidity than the members 
who did not.35 
In consumer litigation funding, a personal injury plaintiff can obtain a $500 to 
$100,000 cash advance in return for repayment of the principal plus interest and 
fees from the lawsuit proceeds.36 The plaintiff can apply for funding anytime prior 
to the resolution of the case. The maximum advance is much larger than the 
maximum payday loan principal—$1000. Like those in payday lending, the 
interest rates in funding are high: they can vary from 2–15% per month, resulting 
in APRs over 200%.37 Unlike payday lending, which mostly occurs at physical 
outlets, most consumer legal finance takes place online.38 A plaintiff can fill out 
an application for a cash advance on the Internet and communicate with the 
funder via telephone.39 Whereas payday loan applications focus on the 
 
 32.  PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY 
BORROW, AND WHY 14 (2012). Survey participants were asked: Thinking back now to (that FIRST/the) 
time you took out a (online payday loan/payday loan/auto title loan), which of the following best 
describes what specifically you needed the money for? 
  1. To pay rent or a mortgage 
  2. To pay for food and groceries 
  3. To pay a regular expense, such as utilities, car payment, credit card bill, or prescription drugs 
  4. To pay an unexpected expense, such as a car repair or emergency medical expense 
  5. To pay for something special, such as a vacation, entertainment, or gifts 
  6. (Do not read) Other (specify). 
Id. 7% of respondents replied with something other than the categories above. Id.  
 33.  See Marieke Bos et al., Balancing Act: New Evidence and a Discussion of the Theory on the 
Rationality and Behavioral Anomalies of Choice in Credit Markets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., forthcoming); 
Susan Payne Carter, Payday Loan and Pawnshop Usage: The Impact of Allowing Payday Loan Rollovers, 
49 J. CONSUMER AFF. 436, 436 (2015). 
 34.  See Sumit Agarwal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring 
Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 412, 415 (2009).  
 35.  See Susan Payne Carter et al., Pecuniary Mistakes? Payday Borrowing by Credit Union 
Members, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL 
MARKETPLACE 145, 148 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Annamaria Lusardi eds., 2011).  
 36.  Jean Xiao, Note, Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation Funding at the Bargaining Table, 
68 VAND. L. REV. 261, 265 (2015). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 85–86 (2002) (“There are now many small, private firms advertising on the Internet 
that will give plaintiffs money in exchange for a share of the proceeds of the litigation . . . .”).  
 39.  See, e.g., Apply Now in Seconds, OASIS FIN., https://www.oasisfinancial.com/apply/ApplyForm/ 
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consumer’s ability to pay (that is, proof of income and bank account in good 
standing), funding applications focus on basic information about the lawsuit. The 
financier assesses the strength of the consumer’s case by looking at factors such 
as potential damages and the likelihood of gaining a favorable settlement or 
winning the trial.40 The funder also gathers information on attorney’s fees and 
other debts that would take priority, such as medical liens.41 
With the exception of some financiers checking to see whether plaintiffs have 
filed for bankruptcy, consumer credit status is unimportant because repayment 
comes from lawsuit proceeds.42 Attorneys disburse repayments from case 
proceeds to funders after attorney’s fees and debts to other higher-priority 
creditors are paid.43 As with payday lending, a plaintiff’s funding obligations and 
repayment behavior are not reported to the national credit bureaus.44 Therefore, 
legal finance does not directly affect the plaintiff’s traditional credit score. 
Because repayment comes from the leftover case proceeds, if any, the plaintiff 
pays either the full amount due to the funder or the entire remaining portion of 
the case proceeds—whichever amount is less.45 If the plaintiff loses the lawsuit, 
he pays nothing.46 This is why a funding advance is often referred to as a 
nonrecourse loan. This configuration does not allow a plaintiff to roll over his 
debt.47 The due date of the principal and interest is the date of case resolution. 
Because of the nonrecourse nature of the advance, funding consumers cannot fall 
into the cycle of interest payments that payday loan consumers do. 
Funding cannot cause borrowers to fall into a debt cycle directly but can affect 
borrowers’ financial health indirectly. Plaintiffs who take out nonrecourse loans 
may obtain considerably lower proceeds from the lawsuit because of the high 
interest and fees. After paying the financier, consumers might fall into higher 
levels of debt elsewhere. This is analogous to the situation in which payday 
borrowers go to pawnshops to repay payday loans.48 That is, credit demand spills 
over into other markets because of the interest paid to the first lender. 
For example, assume that a plaintiff will receive a $10,000 settlement in two 
years. He owes 30% of the $10,000 to his attorney, and for his $1,000 cash advance 
 
[https://perma.cc/TUP5-7PDR] (last visited Aug. 19, 2016). 
 40.  Xiao, supra note 36, at 265. 
 41.  Nicholas Beydler, Comment, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Consumer 
Litigation Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2012).  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B)(6)(c) (West 2016) (explaining that the legal services 
provider will disburse the lawsuit proceeds owed to the funder). 
 44.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2254(a)(11) (2016) (“A consumer litigation funding company shall 
not . . . [r]eport a consumer to a credit reporting agency if insufficient funds remain from the net proceeds 
to repay the company.”). 
 45.  Xiao, supra note 36, at 263. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  If a plaintiff wanted more cash, he could seek another funder to buy out the first funder’s cash 
advance. The first funder can choose to buy out its own advance if it learns from the attorney that the 
plaintiff’s case value has significantly increased. 
 48.  See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 32, at 16, 17. 
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from a funder, he owes $3,400 at the end of his case. Without funding, he gets 
$7,000 in two years. With funding, he gets $4,600 on net, after paying the attorney 
and financier. With $2,400 in interest going to the funder, the consumer may have 
to use credit cards to pay off his mortgage, car expenses, and other debts that he 
could not cover with the $4,600. Credit card rates are high, and he may 
accumulate many months of debt. If an option other than funding was available 
to get a $1,000 advance, then the consumer may not have needed to take out the 
credit card loan. In this analysis, it is important to note that taking the $1,000 
funding at the beginning may have been perfectly rational and that he may have 
ended up in a worse financial position without it. The point of this example is to 
illustrate a potential indirect effect of nonrecourse advances: a consumer may 
seek high-interest credit options after his lawsuit has resolved because of the 
large, and potentially unexpected, amount going to the funder. 
The populations of payday lending and consumer litigation funding 
customers are not mutually exclusive, but they also do not completely overlap. 
Payday lending requires a current inflow of income and a checking account. 
Funding has no such requirements, and plaintiffs may be cut off from their source 
of income temporarily or permanently after their accidents. While commentators 
have reported that nonrecourse advances are generally used on living essentials,49 
this article examines data from a national funder and provides more specific 
statistics on the usage of these advances. 
The data are from a national legal financier for advances that the company 
made from 2014 to 2015 (N=37,799).50 Data include the date of the plaintiff’s 
funding and his geographic location. Upon receipt of the funding, each consumer 
wrote a couple of lines about the expected use of their advance. Key words in 
consumers’ answers, such as “mortgage” and “utilities,” were used to formulate 
categories comparable to the ones in the Pew Charitable Trusts payday lending 
study.51 Because customers could write down several things for which they would 
use their funds, percentages were calculated both exclusively—where the 
 
 49.  See Martin, supra note 11, at 84–85; Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems 
Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 
514 (2006). 
 50.  We had data from 2011 to 2013 and 2016 for some, but not all, consumers. Results are very 
similar when calculated with 2011–2016 data. The national financier was promised anonymity in exchange 
for participating in this study. Researchers interested in accessing this data should contact the authors for 
more information. 
 51.  Below are the key words used to form the categories: 
1. Regular expenses = “utility,” “electric,” “water,” “internet,” “lights,” “car,” “vehicle,” 
“bill,” “payment,” “drug,” 
2. Mortgage/rent = “mortgage,” “rent,” “apt,” “home,” “house,” 
3. Food = “food,” “grocer[y, ies],” 
4. Unexpected expenses = “medical,” “emergency,” “funeral,” “crisis” 
5. Gifts/vacation/entertainment = “gift,” “present,” “holiday,” “Christmas,” “vacation” 
6. Money/Income Needed = “money,” “income.” 
Note: The programming picked up multiple endings of these words (for example, “car” and 
“cars”). 
SKIBA_XIAO_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2017  9:52 PM 
No. 3 2017] CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING 125 
consumer does not mention key words in any other category—and non-
exclusively. 
Table 1 depicts the results. Under the exclusive reporting method, about 38% 
of plaintiffs used their advances for regular expenses, 7% for mortgage or rent, 
1% for food, 2% for unexpected expenses, and 1% for gifts, vacation, and 
entertainment; 7% indicated two or more of these five categories, whereas 4% 
expressly indicated that money was needed but did not state the purpose for 
which it was needed. Under the non-exclusive reporting method, about 44% of 
plaintiffs spent their advances on regular expenses, 12% on mortgage or rent, 2% 
on food, 2% on unexpected expenses, and 1% on gifts, vacation, and 
entertainment; 9% stated expressly in their comments that money was needed. 
Calculations show that 51% indicated categories one to three, which consist of 
living expenses, without indicating categories four or five. This is lower than the 
payday lending statistic of 68% but still comparable. The percentage may be 
lower due to the freeform way in which consumers recorded the use(s) of their 
advances. 
 
Table 1. Consumer Use of Payday Loans and Litigation Funding52 
 











53 38 44 
Mortgage or Rent 10 7 12 





16 2 2 
Gifts, Vacation, or 
Entertainment 




--- 4 9 
More Than One 
Category 




 52.  The statistics about payday loans in this table come from a 2012 study by the Pew Charitable 
Trusts, cited in footnote 32. The statistics about consumer litigation funding are calculations the authors 
made with data from a national legal financier. 
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Similar to those of payday lending, consumers of litigation finance are using 
their nonrecourse loans for living expenses, which signals that these plaintiffs are 
cash-constrained. Though no empirical studies confirm that these customers are 
indeed liquidity-constrained, several commentators have opined that this is the 
case.53 Both Rodak and Martin have recognized the comparability of legal 
finance to other subprime forms of lending.54 Litigation funding can “provide[] 
opportunities for low-income borrowers to buy homes, cars[,] and other goods by 
obtaining credit that is unavailable to them in the prime market”55 and can 
“empower people without access to more traditional credit sources.”56 
In sum, both payday lending and consumer legal funding are alternative credit 
sources that lie outside of mainstream banking. Both types of credit involve high 
interest rates, and a majority of borrowers of both use their cash advances on 
living essentials. On the surface, it appears that these two markets and the 
customers who populate them are quite similar. However, looking more in-depth, 
this is not the case. The most poignant differences are that funding is nonrecourse 
and repayment is tied to litigation. Unlike that of payday lenders, the focus of 
funders is not on a consumer’s ability to pay, but instead on the performance of 
the asset, which is the plaintiff’s case. Because funding is nonrecourse, legal 
finance customers cannot get into the spiral of debt that payday customers can. 
Further, payday loan contracts are simple. Even if borrowers do not understand 
compounding interest, they know the due date of their cash advance (that is, their 
next payday) and the amount due. Although payday borrowers likely understand 
their obligations to the lender, they may mispredict their ability to repay,57 
whereas funding plaintiffs are unlikely to comprehend their obligations to the 
financier in the first place; funding’s tie to litigation complicates the repayment 
calculus. In order to estimate the total interest and fees owed, a plaintiff must 
accurately predict the size and date of his settlement, a date which is often years 
into the future. Part III provides evidence on these points. 
III 
A BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
Traditional economic theory tells us that consumers decide whether or not to 
take a cash advance with repayment down the road by balancing the anticipated 
 
 53.  See, e.g., STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE 
UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 10, 12 (2010) (“Presumably, then, most recipients 
of non-recourse loans either have exhausted their ability to obtain financing from more common sources 
or they are attracted to legal funding because they like the fact that the amount they must repay can be 
no larger than the amount they recover from their lawsuits.”).  
 54.  Martin, supra note 11, at 84–85; Rodak, supra note 49, at 514 (citation omitted). 
 55.  Rodak, supra note 49, at 514. 
 56.  Martin, supra note 11, at 85. 
 57.  Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 105, 
123 tbl.2 (2013) (showing that approximately 40% of borrowers mispredict how long it will take for them 
to repay their payday loan). 
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monetary and nonmonetary benefits against current and future costs.58 Despite 
often being labeled as predatory, high-interest credit products can be completely 
rational when customers have no other credit options and the benefit of $300 
today outweighs the cost of forgoing $300 plus fees the next pay period. However, 
empirical studies from behavioral economics have documented that borrowers 
are not perfectly rational and are indeed susceptible to shortcomings and biases 
during the decisionmaking process.59 For example, Skiba and Tobacman found 
that over half of payday loan customers defaulted within one year of their first 
loan and that those who defaulted typically had already repaid or serviced five 
loans, a sign that borrowers were failing to optimize their well-being.60 The 
authors discovered that this behavior was not consistent with a rational model of 
decisionmaking but instead better aligned with a model that captures 
mispredictions about self-control behavior and future patience (the so-called 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model).61 That is, the consumer is not as patient as 
he believes he will be in the future,62 leading him to mispredict the likelihood of 
successfully retiring his debt the next payday. This part of the article uses insights 
from behavioral economics to explain how borrowers may interact with payday 
lending and funding differently in the decisionmaking process. Particularly, it 
elaborates on how legal finance’s tie to litigation obscures its effect on the 
consumer’s cash flow and complicates the calculus of repayment. 
First, funding’s relationship to lawsuits hides its impact on consumers’ cash 
flow due to the effects of salience, differential mental accounting, and lack of the 
pain of payment.63 Research has shown that customers do not heed certain 
components of price and thus underestimate price if these components are not 
salient.64 Consumers automatically pay more attention to product features that 
are different from the typical characteristics in a “reference” product,65 while they 
have to exert more cognitive effort to consider less salient product attributes.66 
Payday loan features are quite standard in the realm of lending. The benefit is 
the upfront cash; the costs are the interest and fees. Consumers can see that these 
costs come out of their paychecks. Even though borrowers may not understand 
how annualized interest rates work,67 borrowers are well aware that they owe, for 
 
 58.  See Bos et al., supra note 33. 
 59.  See generally Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 315 (2009). 
 60.  Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting: 
Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default 1–3 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Research 
Paper No. 08-33, 2008). 
 61.  Id. at 3. 
 62.  Id. at 9. 
 63.  See infra notes 64–74. 
 64.  See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
1145, 1145 (2009) (finding that “consumers underreact to taxes that are not salient”).  
 65.  See Pedro Bordalo et al., Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1243, 1243–44 
(2012).  
 66.  Chetty et al., supra note 64, at 1165. 
 67.  See Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy: 
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example, a $300 principal plus $60 in fees the next payday. In contrast, litigation 
funding is more opaque. Repayment of an advance comes out of the income the 
plaintiff receives in the form of a settlement or trial award. Because, procedurally, 
repayment comes out of the one-time case proceeds rather than regular income, 
funding’s effect on income is not salient, and consumers are likely to 
underestimate the costs of legal finance, which are realized years after the 
advances are disbursed to plaintiffs. Not only are the costs less salient than those 
of payday lending but the benefits are more salient. Unlike most financial 
products that provide upfront cash, funding is nonrecourse. This striking 
difference will lead customers to focus on the fact that they cannot get into a debt 
spiral and to pay more attention to the benefits than the costs of obtaining an 
advance. 
Differential mental accounting and the lack of pain of payment only worsen 
the undervaluation of costs and accentuation of benefits. Research demonstrates 
that consumers do not perceive all money to be equal—in other words, money is 
not fungible.68 People judge money differently based on the source of the funds.69 
Though it is clear to customers that payday loan repayments come out of their 
bank accounts, they may not consider settlement or trial award money as a part 
of their income because they categorize the cash distinctly in their minds. 
Consumers may be more willing to spend money from their lawsuit proceeds than 
from other sources of income, such as wages, to pay for funding, simply due to 
the different mental labels they put on the accounts. 
Research also shows that a customer experiences pain or disutility when he 
spends money to pay for a good or service, potentially through loss aversion.70 
When the consumer gives the money to the vendor, the amount of money in his 
bank account decreases. If his reference point was the level of money in the 
account prior to the payment, then he experiences a “loss.”71 Psychologically, this 
loss negatively impacts him more than an addition to his account of the same 
magnitude would positively impact him.72 Thus, when making decisions, people 
tend to avoid the choice that they perceive will result in loss.73 The role of the 
pain associated with loss is to mitigate consumer overestimation of benefits and 
underestimation of costs during the decisionmaking process.74 For payday 
lending, this disutility comes every two weeks when the consumer pays off either 
 
Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 12 (2014) (summarizing studies in which consumers 
did not understand compounding interest). 
 68.  See generally Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 
183 (1999) (giving an overview of research demonstrating that not money is not fungible). 
 69.  Id. at 196–97. 
 70.  See Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings 
and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 25 (1998).  
 71.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1039 (1991). 
 72.  See id. (“[L]osses and disadvantages have greater impact on preferences than gains and 
advantages.”). 
 73.  See id. at 1057. 
 74.  Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 70, at 25.  
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the whole loan plus interest or that term’s interest. However, for litigation 
funding plaintiffs, this disutility likely never occurs. After a case resolves, the 
attorney usually disburses the principal, interest, and fees that are owed to the 
financier and then gives the plaintiff any remaining proceeds. Because the 
plaintiff does not write a check or physically make a payment to the financier, he 
does not experience the loss associated with his cash advance. 
Second, funding’s tie to litigation complicates the repayment calculus. The 
price of payday lending is initially clear: the consumer has to pay $10–$20 per 
$100 borrowed per pay cycle. On the other hand, the price of funding is complex 
even at the outset because of the financial service’s relationship to lawsuits. A 
simple example illustrates this point. Assume that a financier follows the 
industry’s best disclosure practices, which have been incorporated into disclosure 
regulations by some states,75 and provides the following repayment schedule for 
a $1,000 cash advance with a 10% additive monthly interest rate76: 
 
Total amount to be repaid by consumer 
if at 6 months: $1,600 
if at 12 months: $2,200 
if at 18 months: $2,800 
if at 24 months: $3,400 
if at 30 months: $4,000 
if at 36 months: $4,600 
if at 42 months: $5,200 
 
For any other financial product, this type of repayment schedule adequately 
informs consumers because the length of time depends on factors that are not 
directly related to the product. For payday lending, repayment duration depends 
on spending and borrowing in other areas of the customer’s life. However, for 
funding, repayment depends on the outcome of the associated asset—the case. 
Personal injury plaintiffs do not have the necessary financial or legal expertise 
to evaluate potential lawsuit outcomes or the ability to compute corresponding 
probabilities (for example, a 62% chance of settling at $X in nine months or a 
38% chance of winning a trial award of $Y in twenty-five months). A huge 
portion of the U.S. population is neither financially nor contractually literate.77 
Many people lack an understanding of numeracy (that is, “the capacity to do a 
simple calculation related to compounding of interest rates”), inflation, and risk 
diversification.78 Research shows that those who are less financially sophisticated 
 
 75.  See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104 (2016).  
 76.  Interest rates are not necessarily additive for all funders; interest rates can be compounded. We 
use an additive rate for simplicity. 
 77.  See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 67, at 11–12 (summarizing the results of existing empirical 
studies on financial literacy in the U.S. adult population); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, 
Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 237–38 (2002) (concluding that millions of 
Americans have low contractual literary). 
 78.  Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 67, at 10 (explaining what constitutes financial literacy).  
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are more likely to make investment mistakes and engage in high-cost borrowing 
like payday loans.79 Additionally, many people are unable to extract important 
aspects of transactions from lengthy and complex contract documents.80 Thus, 
even with a payment schedule like the one above, plaintiffs will be unable to 
compute a reasonable estimate of the actual price of the nonrecourse advance. 
IV 
WHAT POLICIES ARE OPTIMAL? 
Parts II and III reviewed the similarities and differences between payday 
lending and consumer litigation funding. Part IV takes stock of the types of 
policies that have been implemented to regulate payday loans and explores 
whether similar policies would make sense for nonrecourse advances. 
Specifically, it examines bans, restrictions on loan characteristics, and disclosure 
regulations. From an economics perspective, policymakers should ban funding 
only when the credit product on net harms consumers. Empirical studies are 
critical to understanding how the product will affect borrowers. Because the legal 
finance industry is still developing and little empirical research on how funding 
affects consumer welfare is available at this time, states should not pursue bans. 
States should also not enact restrictions on loan characteristics for three reasons: 
it is difficult to find the optimal parameters for such restrictions; such restrictions 
would likely negatively impact low-income borrowers; and financiers may 
strategically act to render these restrictions ineffective. Part IV concludes by 
arguing for a disclosure policy, coupled with attorney acknowledgment, to help 
customers understand the true costs of funding. 
A. Bans 
Prohibition of a financial service is not justified unless it is on net detrimental 
to consumers. Table 2 depicts the state policies that currently govern payday 
lending. Fourteen states have expressly banned payday loans.81 Existing 
empirical literature does not come to a consensus regarding the effect of payday 
loans on borrowers. There is as much research showing that payday loans help 
consumers as there is demonstrating that these loans harm them.82  
Payday loans may raise the probability of borrowers experiencing negative 
financial consequences: Melzer found that payday loan access increased financial 
 
 79.  See id. at 21–23 (summarizing the results of studies on financial literacy and economic 
outcomes). 
 80.  White & Mansfield, supra note 77, at 240.  
 81.  Skiba, supra note 17, at 1043. 
 82.  See generally John P. Caskey, Payday Lending: New Research and the Big Question, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY 681 (Philip N. Jefferson ed., 2012). Economists 
treat the issue of whether payday lending increases or decreases social welfare as an empirical question. 
Thus, this article does not focus on nonempirical studies. For a source that makes the case for why 
households should be protected from payday lending from a nonempirical perspective, see generally 
Creola Johnson, Congress Protected the Troops: Can the New CFPB Protect Civilians from Payday 
Lending?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 649 (2012).  
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hardship with respect to paying bills,83 Skiba and Tobacman demonstrated that 
having a payday loan raised the likelihood of a personal bankruptcy filing,84 and 
Campbell et al. showed that access to payday lending resulted in a hike in 
involuntary bank account closures.85 Further, Carrell and Zinman discovered that 
the presence of payday lending increased the likelihood of adverse work 
outcomes among Air Force employees.86 
However, others have shown that payday lending has positive effects as an 
alternative credit source. Morgan and Strain demonstrated that banning payday 
loans led to a rise in check bouncing (a more costly alternative to taking out a 
payday loan), complaints to the Federal Trade Commission (a proxy for the level 
of informal bankruptcy), and Chapter 7 bankruptcies.87 Zinman found that after 
a restrictive payday lending law passed in Oregon, check bouncing and the 
likelihood of adverse events, such as job loss, increased.88 Morse provided 
evidence that payday loans aided people in financial distress after natural 
disasters.89 Hynes showed that personal bankruptcy filings did not rise after states 
legalized payday lending and, in fact, fell in areas with large military 
communities.90 Dobbie and Skiba demonstrated that greater payday loan 
principals decrease default rates, suggesting that the money is used to help 
customers manage their budget.91 These studies cast doubt on the assertion that 
payday lending is generally bad for borrowers. Bans are not necessarily the best 
policy because they take away a credit source that may assist in times of need and 
that may deter consumers from engaging in more costly financial behaviors, such 
as writing a check when there are insufficient bank account funds. 
Most states have not yet passed legislation to address legal finance; nor have 
most state supreme courts addressed a challenge to these cash advances. There 
are currently no express prohibitions on funding. The Ohio Supreme Court 
previously banned funding in 2003, but the Ohio legislature overturned this 
policy in 2008.92 Table 3 reports the state policies that currently govern 
nonrecourse advances. 
 
 83.  See Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market, 
126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 519 (2011). 
 84.  Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 1 (Vanderbilt 
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 11-13, 2011). 
 85.  Dennis Campbell et al., Bouncing Out of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of 
Involuntary Bank Account Closures, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 1224, 1224–25 (2012). 
 86.  Scott Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel 
Performance, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2805, 2808 (2014). 
 87.  MORGAN & STRAIN, supra note 29, at 1, 3. 
 88.  See Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on 
Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 546, 546–47 (2010). 
 89.  Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 28, 28 (2011). 
 90.  Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607, 
607 (2012). 
 91.  Will Dobbie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: 
Evidence from Payday Lending, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Oct. 2013, at 256, 256.  
 92.  Xiao, supra note 36, at 274. 
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Prohibitions should be instituted only if nonrecourse advances are on net bad 
for consumers. Because funding is a recent phenomenon, little empirical work 
exists that evaluates the effect of these advances on consumer welfare. In a 
working paper, Xiao examines the effect of access to funding on personal 
bankruptcy and finds that access reduces the Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates.93 As 
more researchers conduct empirical studies, it is plausible that, as in the case of 
payday loans, research on the consequences of using funding will not come to a 
consensus on its net effects on borrowers. Further, unlike the situation in the 
payday loan industry, legal finance rates likely have not fully stabilized and 
equilibrated because the funding industry is still growing. More firms will 
continue to enter and drive the rates down, potentially shifting the consequences 
for plaintiffs. Thus, at this time, states should not ban nonrecourse loans. 
Instead, states should engage in data collection efforts and partner with 
financiers to systematically evaluate long-term consumer outcomes. Maine, 
Nebraska, and Vermont all mandate that financiers report aggregate data on 
their businesses including the total number of nonrecourse loans made, the 
aggregate dollar amount of such fundings, and the total amount charged to 
customers including interest and one-time fees.94 However, these reporting 
requirements do not go far enough. States should instead seek data on individual 
transactions and partner with financiers to conduct telephone surveys to obtain 
consumer outcome data on how many consumers ended up in bankruptcy, 
whether the financing carried plaintiffs over to their next paycheck, and similar 
inquiries. 
B. Restrictions On Loan Characteristics 
In terms of regulating payday loan characteristics, thirty states have capped 
interest rates, thirty-three have capped loan sizes, thirty-five have restricted loan 
lengths, and thirty-three have limited rollovers.95 Colorado, New Hampshire, 
Ohio, and Montana have interest rate caps so low that it is unprofitable for most 
financiers to operate in these states.96 Thus, these states have effectively banned 
payday lending without certain empirical evidence that payday loans are on net 
bad for borrowers.97 Economic research on consumer behavior suggests that the 
second and third measures—capping loan sizes and restricting loan lengths—may 
be ineffective, but the fourth—limiting rollovers—may yield positive results. 
Dobbie and Skiba found that a larger loan size led to a lower likelihood of 
 
 93.  See Jean Xiao, The Effect of Consumer Litigation Funding on Bankruptcy (Working Paper, 
2017).  
 94.  ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-107 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3309 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8,  
§ 2260 (2016).  
 95.  See infra Table 2. 
 96.  See infra Table 2; see also Legal Status of Payday Loans by State, PAYDAY LOAN CONSUMER 
INFO., http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/state-information [https://perma.cc/NK76-SPZG] (last visited Oct. 
17, 2016). 
 97.  See supra Part IV.A.  
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default,98 and Carter et al. demonstrated that longer loan lengths had very little 
effect on the likelihood of repayment and renewal of payday loans.99 However, 
Skiba and Tobacman showed that borrowers tend to mispredict their ability to 
repay payday loans;100 this contributes to customers rolling over their loans 
multiple times only to end up in debt traps. Thus, the fourth measure of 
restricting the number of renewals may improve consumer welfare, but 
monitoring compliance with such regulations has proven difficult.101 
With little empirical work on funding, it is difficult to know whether limiting 
some aspects of funding will be beneficial. However, restrictions on various 
characteristics of nonrecourse loans are inadvisable for three reasons. First, 
finding the optimal parameters for such restrictions is difficult. Financiers and 
consumers are heterogeneous: financiers have distinct costs of capital, and 
consumers likely have different opinions on whether maximizing the size of their 
cash advance or their share of lawsuit proceeds most benefits them. Second, 
limiting different aspects of funding will hurt low-income borrowers. Arkansas, 
Colorado, Indiana, and Tennessee have interest rate caps that make it 
unprofitable for most funders to operate in these states.102 Policymakers may 
have good intentions in limiting interest rates; they may see funding as a valuable 
alternative credit source for those in need and want to lower the price to make it 
less costly for low-income consumers. However, in setting extremely low rates, 
these policymakers cause the supply of funding to dry up as financiers pull away. 
Plaintiffs who take up nonrecourse advances are likely liquidity-constrained and 
have low incomes. Some funding consumers are likely to be among the payday 
borrowing population. As legal financiers leave states with very low interest rate 
caps,103 these consumers may resort to payday lending or other forms of more 
costly capital, through which they may end up in debt traps while waiting for 
lawsuit proceeds. Thus, the unavailability of nonrecourse loans mostly hurts 
those who have the greatest need and have very few, if any, financial options. 
Finally, financiers may engage in strategic actions to render funding 
restrictions ineffective. It is common for companies to adjust their behavior to 
get around regulations. For example, Delaware limits the number of loans per 
year that payday loan consumers can take out.104 To evade this policy, payday 
lenders in Delaware have reclassified themselves as installment lenders, allowing 
 
 98.  Dobbie & Skiba, supra note 91, at 256. 
 99.  See Susan Payne Carter et al., The Effect of Having More Time to Repay a Payday Loan: 
Implications for Understanding Borrower Myopia 2 (Working Paper, 2017).  
 100.  See Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 60, at 2–3. 
 101.  See Skiba, supra note 17, at 1045. 
 102.  See infra Table 3. 
 103.  See Andrew G. Simpson, Litigation Financing Firm Exits Tennessee as New Law Goes into 
Effect, INS. J. (July 3, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2014/07/03/333772.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7WTZ-9XS9].  
 104.  SUSANNA MONTEZEMOLO, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PAYDAY LENDING ABUSES 
AND PREDATORY PRACTICES 4 n.11 (2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/ 
reports/10-Payday-Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX65-FUPH]. 
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them to offer an unrestricted number of loans.105 Similarly, payday lenders in 
Ohio have reclassified themselves as mortgage lenders to avoid payday loan 
laws.106 In regard to consumer litigation funding, Maine prohibits financiers from 
assessing fees forty-two months after the contract date; Nebraska and Tennessee 
prohibit funders from accruing fees thirty-six months after the contract date.107 
There are a number of actions that funders can take in response to such laws. 
Financiers may stop funding lawsuits with long repayment horizons (for example, 
medical malpractice cases108) or may fund cases only in the latter stages of 
litigation, which have less uncertainty about their settlement prospects. Some 
firms may shift their capital to higher value claims to maximize revenues. Others 
in Maine and Nebraska may choose to hike up prices for the months during which 
fees can be charged; financiers cannot do this in Tennessee because Tennessee 
also caps interest and fees. Any of these financier actions would render the 
original duration restrictions ineffective. 
C. Disclosure Regulations 
Payday loans are subject to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).109 TILA 
requires lenders to reveal the cost of the loan, including finance charges and 
APR, in a clear and conspicuous manner.110 Some states have additional 
disclosure provisions in their consumer credit statutes.111 Two recurring types of 
provisions are payday loan purpose statements and state consumer finance 
authority information clauses.112 Nine states require financiers to tell their 
customers that payday loans are intended to address short-term needs and are 
not long-term solutions.113 Twelve states mandate that lenders provide 
information to borrowers about the state financial department that is in charge 




 105.  Id.  
 106.  Payday Lenders Adept at Evading State Law, Democratic Committee Staff Report Finds, U.S. 
HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS. DEMOCRATS (June 16, 2016), http://democrats.financialservices.house 
.gov [https://perma.cc/48JZ-CF2A].  
 107.  See infra Table 3. 
 108.  A medical malpractice lawsuit can take, on average, five years from injury to case resolution. 
David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2027 (2006). 
 109.  Truth in Lending, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/truth-in-lending/index-truth-in-lending 
.html [https://perma.cc/H67R-WG92] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
 110.  Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be 
Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 69 (2004). 
 111.  See infra Table 2.  
 112.  See infra Table 2. 
 113.  See infra Table 2. 
 114.  See infra Table 2. 
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TILA does not automatically cover legal finance because funders arguably do 
not qualify as “creditors” under the Act.115 However, a state’s usury statute may 
incorporate TILA obligations, and if a court finds a nonrecourse advance to be a 
loan in that state, then funding will be subject to TILA requirements. Colorado 
is the only state that has decided at the supreme court level that funding is a 
loan.116 To date, states that regulate legal finance by statute have set their own 
disclosure provisions including (1) a minimum font size, (2) itemization of one-
time fees, (3) provision of a schedule of repayments, and (4) disclosure of the 
APR. These state laws are similar to TILA requirements because both mandate 
that the same information—finance charges and APRs—be disclosed. 
Though normal disclosure regulations involving APR and fees may be 
effective for payday lending, different disclosures may be needed for litigation 
finance because funding’s relationship to litigation hides its effect on the 
consumer’s cash flow and complicates the repayment calculus. Instead of giving 
the plaintiff a very complicated contract with an itemization of various fees, a 
repayment schedule, and the APR, the funder should give the plaintiff an 
estimate of how much he will owe and when the amount owed will be due. Refer 
back to the example in part III and assume that the financier predicts the case 
will settle twenty-four months after the contract date. Under this proposal, the 
financier should directly disclose that the plaintiff will owe the financier $3,400—
$1,000 for the principal and $2,400 in fees—on X date, which is twenty-four 
months after the date of the funding agreement. Such a disclosure would focus 
the consumer’s attention on the cost of the advance and obviate the consumer’s 
need to do any additional calculations. 
Although funders will likely require a few years of experience (and thus a 
phase-in period) prior to being able to generate precise estimates of repayment 
amount and due date, such approximations are feasible. The workings of the 
insurance industry demonstrate clearly how data analysis can help with profit and 
loss predictions. Insurance companies possess software to analyze case 
characteristics and eventual payment outcomes.117 After they gather enough data 
points, these companies use the software to generate estimates of what different 
cases are worth, and they are also able to predict their profits and losses.118 
Likewise, financiers can invest in software to analyze case characteristics and 
repayment outcomes. They can use the software to predict funding durations, as 
well as profits and losses. 
One counterargument to this proposal may be that the plaintiff can get a case 
duration estimate from his attorney and then figure out what he will owe and 
 
 115.  Martin, supra note 110, at 69. 
 116.  Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 401 (Colo. 2015).  
 117.  See, e.g., MARK ROMANO & J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., LOW BALL: AN 
INSIDER’S LOOK AT HOW SOME INSURERS CAN MANIPULATE COMPUTERIZED SYSTEMS TO 
BROADLY UNDERPAY INJURY CLAIMS 1 (2012), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Studies.Computer 
Claims06-04-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XB-8XG8].  
 118.  Id. at 2–3. 
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when he must pay. Experienced attorneys may be able to generate case duration 
predictions, but financiers should do so instead for several reasons. First, funders 
can generate more precise estimates. Though attorneys can predict when cases 
will settle from their filing dates, plaintiffs obtain nonrecourse advances at 
different stages of litigation. Financiers can better assess repayment dates by 
conducting data analysis with the filing, funding, and repayment dates from 
previous cases. Next, attorneys’ estimates center on case characteristics, whereas 
funders’ estimates take into consideration statutory liens and other debts because 
funders are not first in priority to get the case proceeds. Also, attorneys’ estimates 
are generally derived from their own funded and unfunded cases. Financiers’ 
estimates are from only funded cases, across various attorneys. In a working 
paper, Xiao shows that access to funding increases claim payment and duration 
of medical malpractice claims.119 This provides evidence that the litigation 
outcomes of funded cases differ from unfunded ones. Thus, financiers have more 
relevant samples. Additionally, financiers’ samples have more predictive power 
because they include data across attorneys and are likely larger. In sum, funders’ 
rather than attorneys’ estimates may be more precise and appropriate for 
consumers to get a sense of when and how much the repayment will be. 
The second reason that financiers should have the burden of generating 
estimates is that producing precise approximations is costly due to the technology 
required. If the obligation of providing these approximations rested on attorneys, 
attorneys may start charging fees, making such predictions available only to 
plaintiffs with more resources. Third, there may be legal reasons why attorneys 
should not give these predictions. For example, questions may arise concerning 
whether attorneys are agents of financiers for liability purposes. Finally, even if 
attorneys could easily give consumers precise case-duration estimates, many 
consumers may lack the financial and contractual literacy, as well as the impetus, 
to put the lawsuit information from their attorneys together with information 
from the funding agreements in order to generate accurate repayment amounts 
and dates. 
The proposed disclosure policy not only obviates the need for financially and 
contractually unsophisticated consumers to make complex judgments related to 
litigation and connect these assessments to repayment of nonrecourse advances, 
but it also mitigates the problem of potentially waiving attorney-client privilege 
and work-product doctrine protection.120 By placing the legal burden on 
financiers to make precise predictions, financiers hopefully will cease attempting 
to extract case value and duration estimates from plaintiffs’ attorneys in order to 
figure out the profitability of these advances. If plaintiffs’ attorneys provide these 
 
 119.  See Jean Xiao, The Effect of Consumer Litigation Funding on Medical Malpractice Litigation 
(Working Paper, 2017). 
 120.  For how funding relates to attorney-client privilege, see generally Grace M. Giesel, Alternative 
Litigation Finance and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 95 (2014). For how funding 
relates to the work product doctrine, see generally Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and 
the Work-Product Doctrine, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1083 (2012). 
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estimates, then the predictions and any accompanying information may lose 
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Currently, the laws 
surrounding funding, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product 
doctrine are unsettled and vary in different jurisdictions.121 This article’s proposal 
encourages financiers to collect their own data in order to generate estimates of 
repayment amounts and dates and to calculate their own profits and losses. 
Under the proposal, financiers will need only case information that would be 
disclosed to defendants anyway in order for defendants to make settlement 
offers; that is, financiers will require only non-confidential information. 
Though some literature documents the failure of disclosure laws,122 these laws 
may work for funding if they are coupled with attorney acknowledgments. One 
of the main reasons why disclosure laws do not work is because firms 
intentionally hide disclosures or prevent consumers from reading them.123 With 
funding, borrowers have access to the attorney that is representing them in their 
underlying case. Currently, five states—Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, and 
Tennessee—have provisions in their funding statutes that require a written 
acknowledgment by the plaintiff’s attorney that verifies that the attorney has 
reviewed the contract and all disclosures related to the cost of the nonrecourse 
loan have been made.124 This way, the attorney can confirm that the financier has 
actually revealed the necessary information in an understandable way. Such 
acknowledgments can stop financiers from burying the costs deep in the contract 
or attempting to pressure plaintiffs into signing before reviewing the disclosures. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Consumer litigation funding is not just another form of payday lending. 
Funding has similarities with payday lending because they are both alternative 
financial services, involve high interest rates, and cater to customers who need 
money for living expenses. However, they differ in ways that regulators should 
recognize. Many justify bans on payday lending by pointing to the fact that 
millions of borrowers every year are getting stuck in an inescapable cycle of 
interest payments. While legal finance has real costs, funding’s nonrecourse 
nature prevents consumers from getting stuck in a cyclical repayment of debt. 
Moreover, prohibitions may not be appropriate at this time because there is little 
empirical evidence on how funding affects consumer welfare and there is room 
for interest rates to fall as the industry continues to expand and competition 
 
 121.  See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 6.09(B)(5)(a)–(b), at 140–42 (2012) (discussing the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product doctrine in relation to disclosing information to a funder). 
 122.  See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1321–
26 (2015); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
 123.  Willis, supra note 122, at 1322–24. 
 124.  IND. CODE § 24-12-2-1 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12-104 (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3303 
(2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2016); TENN. CODE § 47-16-104 (2016).  
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increases among funders. States should take the initiative to partner with 
financiers to study the effect of this new form of credit on borrowers. 
Both payday loans and funding can help consumers who are in financial 
distress. Appropriate regulation is necessary to make sure cash-constrained 
consumers are making informed choices. Though funding’s nonrecourse nature 
makes it less dangerous for customers, its tie to litigation makes it more difficult 
for customers to truly understand its price. It is cognitively cumbersome for 
consumers to link how lawsuit proceeds relate to income. They experience almost 
no pain of paying to help them assess the costs. To address consumer 
understanding, some states have implemented disclosure regulations that 
mandate that funders itemize the fees, present a repayment schedule, and relay 
the APR. However, customers do not have the legal expertise or financial 
sophistication to estimate case duration and to put this information together with 
funding contract terms to get an accurate sense of where they may end up on a 
repayment schedule. Thus, financiers should disclose a reasonable approximate 
repayment amount and date to improve borrowers’ understanding of the costs of 
nonrecourse advances. 
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Table 2. Payday Lending State Policies as of Year 2016125 
 
State Express Bans 
and Caps on 
Interest 
Rate/Fees 









day $100 loan 
*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: 10–31 days 






*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: min 14 days 
*max # rollovers: 2 
*payday loans 







Arizona *Express ban   





*$300 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 31 days 









*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: min 6 
months 
*max # rollovers: 1 
rollover at 45% interest 
 
Connecticut *Express ban   
D.C. *Express ban   
Delaware 
 *$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 60 days 
*max # rollovers: 4 
*payday loans 







*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: 7–31 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
 
Georgia *Express ban   
  
 
 125.  In addition to our own research using Westlaw and LexisNexis, we also obtained information 
from paydayloaninfo.org.  
SKIBA_XIAO_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2017  9:52 PM 





*$600 max loan amount 
*loan term: 32 days 







 *$1000 max loan 
amount 
*max # rollovers: 3 
*payday loans 











*max loan amount: the 
minimum of $1000 or 
25% gross monthly 
income  
*loan term: 13–45 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
*payday loans 











* max loan amount: the 
minimum of $550 or 
20% gross monthly 
income 
*loan term: min 14 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
*payday loans 











*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 31 days 






*$500 max loan amount 






*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: 14–60 days 






*$350 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 60 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
 
Maine *Express ban   
Maryland *Express ban   
Massachusetts *Express ban   
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*$600 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 31 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
*payday loans 











*$350 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 30 days 






*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: under $250, 
max 30 days; $250–500, 
28–30 days 






*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: 14–31 days 






*$300 max loan amount 










*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 34 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
 
Nevada 
 * max loan amount: 
25% gross monthly 
income 







*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: 7–30 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
*payday loans 












*$2500 max loan 
amount 
*loan term: 14–35 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
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New York *Express ban   
North 
Carolina 





*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 60 days 






*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: min 31 days 










*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: 12–45 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
*payday loans 











*loan term: min 31 days 
*max # rollovers: 2 
 





*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: min 13 days 







*$550 max loan amount 
*loan term: max 31 days 




 *$500 max loan amount 








*$425 max loan amount 
for $500 check 
*loan term: max 31 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
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day $100 loan 
*loan term: 7–31 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
*payday loans 



















day $100 loan 
*$500 max loan amount 
*loan term: min 2 pay 
periods 






* max loan amount: the 
minimum of $700 or 
30% gross monthly 
income 
*loan term: max 45 days 
*max # rollovers: 0 
 
West Virginia *Express ban   
Wisconsin 
 * max loan amount: the 
minimum of $1500 or 
35% gross monthly 
income 
*loan term: max 90 days 






*loan term: 1 month 
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Arkansas *17% per year  *Minimum font size 
*APR disclosure 
Colorado *Depends on 
amount 
charged; highest 
potential cap is 
36% per year 
 *Truth in Lending Act 
requirements 





Maine  *Shall not assess 
fees exceeding 42 
months after 
contract date 
*Minimum font size 
*Itemization of one-




Nebraska  *Shall not assess 
fees exceeding 36 
months after 
contract date 
*Minimum font size 
*Itemization of one-




Ohio   *Minimum font size 
*Itemization of one-




Oklahoma   *Minimum font size 
*Itemization of one-





 126.  This table includes information from state statutes and state supreme court cases.  
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Tennessee *Effectively 
46% per year 
*Shall not assess 
fees exceeding 36 
months after 
contract date 
*Minimum font size 
*APR disclosure 
Vermont   *Minimum font size 
*Itemization of one-
time fees  
*Schedule of 
repayments 
*APR disclosure 
 
